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12 March 1982

East Europe Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

(FOUO 5/82)



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POLAND

'TIMES' CORRESPONDENT DESCRIBES CONDITIONS IN WARSAW

PMO81319 London THE TIMES in English 8 Jan 82 p 20

[Roger Boyes "Letter From Warsaw": "The Miseries of Living Each Uneasy Day as it Comes"]

[Excerpt] Two weeks into martial law and, according to official accounts, local opposition to military rule had ended. The thousand miners occupying the Piast mine in Silesia have ended their sit-in strike, although it is not really clear how the army achieved this "pacification." Earlier pacification of the Wujec mine involved the shooting of seven miners out of self-defense, according to the government spokesman.

We have, the government spokesman tells us (foreign correspondents, not the nation), entered the second phase of martial law: the thaw. That is certainly true enough of Warsaw, but Radom, Gdansk and other towns appear still to be at the heavy snow-fall stage of the cycle. And nobody knows how long Warsaw will remain quiet when the telephones are restored.

Solidarity, the independent union, needs telephone contact to regroup, so the military solution dictates there will be no telephone system. Unfortunately, the economy also needs telephones and enterprise managers, already afraid of making too independent-sounding decisions, are simply not functioning. The workers sense the mood and partly in sympathy with Solidarity, partly out of post-Christmas doziness, produce only token amounts.

Two weeks into martial law and the stunned shock has given way to national lassitude and a barely concealed cynicism. At Szczecin shipyards, fork-lift truck drivers ferry meaningless loads from one end to another, repeating the process endlessly until it is time to go home. Home is where most people go after work nowadays; cafe society has dwindled to a hardy gaggle of students, unsure whether they will be called up or whether they will have to repeat the winter semester.

Big ideas, once the small change of cafe conversation, are no longer social currency. Informers are back in fashion; when asked, people laugh and say, of course they were asked to cooperate and of course they refused. But the uneasiness lingers and excuses are made: the last bus before curfew has to be caught at 8.30.

The soldiers no longer know why they are there, manning the roadblocks, acting as auxiliary policemen. The army newspaper gives warning daily of the Solidarity

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"extremists" but most soldiers would not recognize the gross caricatures fed to them in their political education lessons. The conscripts have schoolfriends in the union, while the professionals seem to have been expecting some form of partisan attack, car bombs and shootings.

Instead, day by day they see quite normal Poles, commuting from queue to queue, some of them openly contemptuous of the rifles and uniforms, most of them sullenly compliant. The troops are moved regularly, rotated with units outside Warsaw, to reduce the tedium and the sense of futility.

Even the dullest trooper has now realized that there is no imminent prospect of a parachute attack on the bridge that he is guarding. Meanwhile, it is impossible for anyone to cross a bridge by foot in Warsaw. A Pole who lives on the wrong side of the Vistula will have to wait for the notoriously self-willed trams to take him the 100 yards to his home.

Solidarity still exists, both officially and unofficially. Officially, because unions are permitted provided that they engage in no union activities. Unofficially, because after dusk small knots of Solidarity sympathizers meet in churches, the only really safe haven. Priests have been instructed by their bishops to take no part in political activity, but the meetings happen anyway, sometimes in the vestry by candlelight.

The Warsaw chapter of Solidarity, once nine hundred thousand-strong, can still produce a regular bulletin of information, mainly about the condition of the detained union leadership. It bears the hallmarks of hurried printing and is a sobering testimony to what happens when a sophisticated organization with ten million members has to go underground at a moment's notice.

Two weeks into martial law and everything that matters is in a state of suspension. Marriages are put off, couples defer having children for another year, school-leavers stop worrying about careers. Before 13 December, there was an obsession with buying consumer durables—everything from washing machines to abstract paintings—before the zloty lost its value completely.

Now, the obsession is less pronounced. Best travel light is the philosophy, spend on food, the daily needs, forget the long-term planning. A journalist on ZYCIE WARSZAWY, the now suspended, once lively regional newspaper, says he has nothing to do but there is no point in starting a book he has been planning because it involves political judgments. It is no time, with a wife and family to support, to become an instant dissident.

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POLAND

'GUARDIAN' PRINTS PARTIAL TEXT OF GORNICKI COPENHAGEN STATEMENT

PM111205 London THE GUARDIAN in English 11 Jan 82 p 5

[Unattributed report: "'Solidarity Declared War Against the State'"--first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] The following is a partial text of a statement made by Captain Wieslaw Gornicki, a senior advisor to General Jaruzelski, at a meeting of the World Peace Council in Copenhagen last week. It is the fullest public explanation of its case to come from the Polish martial law authorities since the EEC foreign ministers first raised the possibility of sanctions against Poland.

In this crucial moment of Polish history we ask all our friends in the peace movement, not only for understanding, but also for moral and political assistance.

Armed forces are seldom associated with peace activities, yet there are moments when the armed forces become the last resort of safe-guarding peace before it is too late. This is precisely the case in Poland. Public opinion asks what happened in Poland. To our minds, the relevant question is just the opposite: what did not happen in Poland. A bloody prolonged civil war did not take place in Poland, although we were on the verge of it.

A military dictatorship has not been established in Poland. Martial law is a temporary measure, and it will be lifted as soon as possible. Civil liberties will be restored. Finally, European peace and stability were not put into jeopardy. This had been a very real imminent prospect.

That is the starting point. Now let me be more specific.

Nobody can blame the Polish authorities for lack of goodwill. They did their best to prevent the confrontation. Since last March I participated in all negotiations with Solidarity as a member of the government. For about 14 months the Polish government was willing to reach a compromise. We did see--perhaps wrongly-a chance of widening the structure of political life by including an independent trade union in the pattern of our state.

The sad truth is, however, that it simply did not work. Solidarity ceased to be a trade union almost as soon as it was born. It became an opposition political party. The name of an opposition party may not sound very repulsive to many of

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you, but let me make it quite clear: Solidarity was never intended by its extremist leaders to be an opposition party in the Western meaning of the word.

Gradually it became a conglomerate of just about everything right-of-centre, from conservative, openly pro-capitalist tendencies to the brink of fascism.

On 30 October General Jaruzelski offered from the rostrum of the Polish Parliament an entirely new formula for a front of national conciliation. It was meant as a way of sharing executive power with nonparty groups and organisations. All meaningful groups of Polish society, including the Roman Catholic Church, expressed their desire to participate in the front. There was one single exception: Solidarity.

During November, the government undertook several initiatives aimed at national conciliation. General Jaruzelski met the primate of Poland, Archbishop Glemp, and the chairman of Solidarity, Mr Lech Walesa.

On 12 November, in the town of Trzehlatow [as published; probably Trzebiatow] the vice-president of Solidarity, Mr Marian Jurczyk, delivered his famous speech. Mr Jurczyk said, among other things: "What we need are gallows... Those people who run Poland are not Polish, they are either Russians or Jews with changed names... No talk with a government of traitors."

Is that a trade union activity? Where in the world does a trade union call for the death and extermination of fellow workers?

On 4 December, the Presidium of Solidarity met in Radom. This was an open declaration of war against the Polish state. There is ample evidence that, between 4 December and 11 December, preparations were being made for a regular counter-revolutionary coup d'etat, patterned after the classical CIA style. In the night of 12 December, after the Central Commission of Solidarity openly proclaimed a declaration of war against the state, no other option was left for Poland except extraordinary measures in order to restore law and order.

This is not the place to refute all lies spread about Poland. I will confine myself to nine most evident distortions.

- 1. The total number of persons detained was approximately 5,050 at the beginning, now it does not exceed 4,400. An exact number cannot be given because people are constantly being released. The talk of "several tens of thousands of detainees" is plain nonsense.
- 2. The total number of casualties is eight persons. I repeat eight. We all regret it.
- 3. Not a single detained person was subjected to cruel treatment, torture, beating, or exposure to the freezing outdoor air. All those persons will be eventually released, and they will give testimony as to how they were treated.
- 4. While martial law was obviously not greeted with enthusiasm by everyone in Poland, it was not rrue that the Polish nation as a whole resented it. On the

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contrary, the Polish "silent majority" met it with a sigh of relief, irrespective of actual political leanings.

- 5. The introduction of martial law was a strictly Polish, sovereign, domestic issue. There is not a single proof or evidence of any foreign involvement.
- 6. Emergency measures undertaken on 13 December are not aimed at the restoration of what brought Poland to the crisis of 1980.
- 7. It is not true that the preparations for martial law had been made many months in advance... There were no plans for direct military action until virtually the very last moment.
- 8. It is not true that Polish clergy have been subjected to persecution or reprisals. I know of only two or three cases in which priests were detained, but martial law is mandatory for everyone.
- 9. It is not true that all Polish trade unions, including Solidarity, were banned or prohibited or disbanded. Their activities were temporarily suspended and will be permitted to operate again as soon as possible. However, there will be no place for an anti-communist opposition political party. That is over--once and forever.

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YUGOSLAVIA

ITALIAN PAPER INTERVIEWS MILOVAN DJILAS

Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 1 Feb 82 p 9

[Interview with Milovan Djilas by Ettore Petta: "The Italian Communist Party according to Djilas: 'It Follows the Footsteps of the Yugoslavia of 1948 but Its Third Way Is Not Clear'"]

[Text] After the meeting with Moscow--Criticisms of the Soviet Union in the interview with the "great heretic" of Belgrade's communism who is an exile in his own homeland.

Belgrade—Milovan Djilas, the great heretic of Yugoslav communism, is also wondering where the PCI [Italian Communist Party] is going: he can already see it moving "on the road which we opened in 1948" and he thinks that it will go much further. Djilas is interested in finding out whether the PCI will find a specific position on the Italian political scene as a "reformist" party. Finding that place without Iosing its image as a communist party however will be a difficult undertaking: the party of Craxi and the party of Longo as a matter of fact will not give it much room to maneuver. On the other hand, the PCI "at this moment" no longer has a Leninist cast to it; it has come out in favor of political pluralism which as a matter of fact is contrary to the spirit of Leninism. Hence the "break" with the Kremlin which will receive the final official stamp of approval the moment the Soviets establish that the Cossutta group is not able to create trouble for the Berlinguer and Napolitano leadership "with its maneuvers."

In spite of his 70 years, Milovan Djilas still has a youthful face, almost like a calm little boy. His permanently half-closed eyes are lively, attentive, looking at the conversation partner like the eyes of an examiner. The half-lit room, in which he received me with a little cup of Turkish coffee, is full of huge pieces of furniture, such as a big desk, a bookshelf, a small table with chairs, and a bed. The window faces on tree-lined Palmoticeva Street, a silent little street although it is in a very central location, behind the Federal Parliament. This is his kingdom as a "domestic exile" where he however can receive anybody he wants to receive, apparently without any controls. He says that an evolution of "modest liberalization" is taking shape in Serbia and more generally in Yugoslavia; he is certainly less pessimistic about his country's future than he was a few years ago. He does not rule out the possibility that the PCI's policy "might influence or shake the awareness of the Yugoslavia will continue. The alternative would be anarchy."

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But our conversation turned toward the conflict that broke out between two big communist parties, an argument which obviously fascinates him: "Our break with Moscow certainly took place in a situation that was more difficult for us than the situation faced by the PCI today." For Yugoslavia this was really "a question of life or death" and this is why, Djilas says, it was not even possible to listen to the arguments of the Yugoslav pro-Soviet group; Berlinguer today can allow Cossutta to speak without having to fear being overcome by the clout of the Soviet Communist Party.

Now--says Djilas, talking about 1948—the crux of the issue is obviously political. Today, the problem that divides Berlinguer from Erezhnev is essentially ideological; they find themselves facing a reformist party and a Marxist-Leninist party. After the conflicts between Moscow and Belgrade and later on with Peking, the current conflict with Rome "is the most important and also the most original because it is a conflict on the major questions of Leninism." The PCI however is not in an easy situation. According to Djilas, "it is not clear" what Berlinguer means when he talks about the "third way": the PCI's present policy "is not yet the third way" and the dilemma is this: a communist party is that only if it is a Leninist party and if it is not Leninist, it is no longer even communist.

The "third way?" "I believe that Western Europe as a whole is already living in a form of democratic socialism, not perfect, not ideal, but there it is. The third way should be a new form of social and economic existence and this point is not clear in the PCI. The problem of nationalization is complex: if nationalization is productive, it goes well, otherwise it only produces red tape." The Eurocommunists, that is to say, the Italian and Spanish communists, according to Djilas are "the reformists of modern capitalism," a capitalism different from the one considered by Marx and Lenin and now also by the Kremlin. "Capitalism has changed in terms of mentality and in essence" and can no longer be judged through the eyes of Marx and Lenin.

What is to be done, then? Is it necessary to invent a new Marx? Djilas answers that real socialism is no longer capable of producing a new Marx and thus revitalizing his theory. Marx' place in the modern world has been taken by Karl Popper and by Leszek Kolakowski. He also mentioned the names of Zakharov and Zinovev, the Russian exile in Paris, and then added that Leninist ideology is "sclerosed; I would not say that it is dead, as Zakharov maintains, because it can still be used and the Kremlin makes abundant use of it." But when it comes to so-called real socialism "nothing positive can come out of it anymore and that is what Poland tells every day."

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, Djilas says that he is pessimistic because "I am afraid that some day it might cause a big war." He says: "Look at Helsinki; after that conference, the Soviets stepped up the pace of their arms drive, causing an imbalance in East-West military relations." Djilas added that "only a strong West can save the peace."

Between the Soviet policy of President Reagan and that of Chancellor Schmidt, Djilas opts for the one of the White House although he observes that he can very well understand Bonn's attitude since the Germans would be the first victims of a war. But with the USSR "we cannot entertain any illusions: it is a military empire, like the state of Ottoman Turkey."

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